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The cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is an area that continues to provoke
intense theoretical debate among pragmatists. That utterance interpretation involves
some type of mind-reading or theory of mind (ToM) is indisputable. However, theorists
are divided on the exact nature of this ToM-based mechanism. In this paper, it is
argued that the only type of ToM-based mechanism that can adequately represent the
cognitive basis of utterance interpretation is one which reflects the rational, intentional,
holistic character of interpretation. Such a ToM-based mechanism is supported on
conceptual and empirical grounds. Empirical support for this view derives from the study
of children and adults with pragmatic disorders. Specifically, three types of clinical case
are considered. In the first case, evidence is advanced which indicates that individuals
with pragmatic disorders exhibit deficits in reasoning and the use of inferences. These
deficits compromise the ability of children and adults with pragmatic disorders to comply
with the rational dimension of utterance interpretation. In the second case, evidence
is presented which suggests that subjects with pragmatic disorders struggle with the
intentional dimension of utterance interpretation. This dimension extends beyond the
recognition of communicative intentions to include the attribution of a range of cognitive
and affective mental states that play a role in utterance interpretation. In the third case,
evidence is presented that children and adults with pragmatic disorders struggle with the
holistic character of utterance interpretation. This serves to distort the contexts in which
utterances are processed for their implicated meanings. The paper concludes with some
thoughts about the role of theorizing in relation to utterance interpretation.
Keywords: clinical pragmatics, theory of mind, utterance interpretation, pragmatic disorder, reasoning
Introduction
Few post-Gricean pragmatists would deny the central role of mind-reading or theory of mind
(ToM) in utterance interpretation. But what is altogether more contentious is the exact nature
of ToM in the complex cognitive processes whereby speakers produce, and hearers interpret
utterances. This paper presents a particular view of this ToM-based process that is not popular
among pragmatists or cognitive scientists in general. But it is a view that is supported by evidence of
how utterance interpretation is impaired in children and adults with a range of pragmatic disorders.
The view in question depends on three main claims. The first of these claims is that utterance
interpretation involves the full exercise of rationality. When language users produce and interpret
utterances, they are not constrained to operate within a particular rational sub-domain that has
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been identified by some theorists as communicative rationality.
Rather, they are exercising a rational capacity, the key attribute
of which is that it transcends efforts to circumscribe it. The
second claim is that utterance interpretation goes well beyond
the recognition of intentions à la Grice. In fact, it involves the
full gamut of cognitive and affective mental states as well as the
attribution of these states in more or less complex ways to the
minds of language users. The third claim relates to a feature
of utterance interpretation which is almost never explicitly
acknowledged by theorists. That feature concerns the holism
of the knowledge that language users draw upon during their
interpretation of utterances. Pragmatic accounts of utterance
interpretation tend not to emphasize the essential unity of
this knowledge, preferring instead to represent certain aspects
of knowledge as relevant to the interpretation of utterances.
The way in which such accounts misrepresent the holism of
knowledge will be challenged in this article.
So, it will be argued that any ToM-based process that
is to play a role in utterance interpretation must have a
fully rational, intentional, holistic character in the particular
senses outlined above. But such an understanding of utterance
interpretation will not be acceptable to very many pragmatists
and cognitive theorists. The contention that it is not possible
to circumscribe the rational capacity that is exercised during
utterance interpretation—at least if we are to end up with an
intelligible account of this interpretation—will be unpalatable
to cognitive theorists and pragmatists, many of whom have
a substantial appetite for theory construction. However, it
will be argued that although this proposal is unpalatable for
many theorists in the area, it is an authentic representation
of the rational character of utterance interpretation. The
contention that the type of mental state attribution involved in
utterance interpretation extends well beyond the recognition of
communicative intentions will be troubling for those theorists
(e.g., Sperber and Wilson) who believe that such attribution
is the province of a highly specialized ToM module. And the
contention that the knowledge and beliefs which we bring
to utterance interpretation exist as a unified whole will be
unsettling to any pragmatist who has ever talked about the beliefs
and knowledge that are relevant to utterance interpretation
(the implication, of course, is that there are other beliefs and
knowledge that are not relevant to interpretation). Although
each of these contentions will be disturbing to theorists who
hold dear certain assumptions about utterance interpretation,
these assumptions must be challenged if we are to begin to
think in more productive ways about the cognitive basis of such
interpretation. At least this will be our starting point for the
following discussion of the nature and role of ToM in utterance
interpretation.
That the three claims introduced above are valid statements
about normal utterance interpretation will be demonstrated
by examining impairments in the use and understanding of
utterances in children and adults with pragmatic disorders. To
the extent that utterance interpretation involves the exercise of
a rational capacity, we might expect to find deficits in reasoning
and the use of inferences in individuals with pragmatic disorders.
Moreover, to the extent that this rational capacity has an open
texture which evades circumscription, we may expect these
deficits to be evident in domains beyond communication. The
claim that utterance interpretation has an intentional character
that goes beyond the recognition of intentions may also be
verified on the basis of evidence obtained from clients with
pragmatic disorders. We may expect to find deficits in the
attribution of cognitive and affective mental states other than
intentions in children and adults with these disorders. These
states play a vital role in the interpretation of utterances, although
this role is seldom acknowledged by pragmatists. The claim that
the knowledge we bring to utterance interpretation exists as
a unified whole also receives empirical validation from clients
with pragmatic disorders. To the extent that the holism of this
knowledge poses difficulties for clients with pragmatic disorders,
wemay expect them to process utterances within highly restricted
contexts that are isolated from the wider body of knowledge
to which they belong. It will be the aim of later sections to
demonstrate that there is substantial empirical support for all
three of these claims in clinical subjects. In the meantime,
we consider the implications of these claims for the analysis
of a standard communicative exchange of the type routinely
examined in pragmatics.
A Standard Communicative Exchange
The analysis of a standard communicative exchange serves as a
useful starting point for the following discussion. This analysis
will emphasize the rational, intentional, holistic character of
utterance interpretation. In doing so, it will force us to think
differently—and, it is hoped, more critically—about the mainly
modular proposals1 that have tended to dominate cognitive
accounts of interpretation. Consider the exchange below between
Mark and Jane:
Jane: Do you fancy going to Spain again this summer with my
parents?
Mark: They didn’t cope well with the heat last year.
Jane: Okay then. I’ll ask Bill instead.
The apparent ease with which Jane recovers the implicature of
Mark’s utterance—Mark clearly does not wish to go to Spain
in the summer with Jane’s parents—belies the complexity of
the cognitive processes that are integral to this exchange. In
demonstration of these processes, we need to examine the
subconscious steps which Jane must take in order to recover
the implicature of Mark’s utterance. Before Mark can establish
the communicative intention that motivates Jane’s utterance, he
must first undertake a number of pragmatic developments of the
logical form of Jane’s utterance. He must establish the referent
of the pronoun “you” and the period of time that Jane has in
mind when she uses the expression “this summer.” He must
also know the individuals that Jane is referring to through the
use of the noun phrase “my parents.” Only when referents are
obtained for the indexicals “you,” “this,” and “my” can Mark even
1These proposals include most notably contributions from relevance theory
(Wilson and Sperber, 1991; Sperber andWilson, 2002; Sperber, 2005;Wilson, 2005)
and modular pragmatics theory (Kasher, 1991a,b, 1994).
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be said to be in possession of the proposition that is expressed
by Jane’s utterance. But Mark’s cognitive input to this exchange
does not end with the pragmatically enriched proposition of
Jane’s utterance. For this proposition is then subject to further
pragmatic processing. At least part of this processing leads Mark
to the presupposition of the iterative expression “again” in Jane’s
utterance—the presupposition that Jane and Mark have been to
Spain before. It is also this additional processing which enables
Mark to see that Jane is doingmore thanmerely posing a question
in the above exchange. For Jane is simultaneously suggesting that
Spain should be the destination of their next summer vacation
and that her parents should be their traveling companions during
this trip. It is only when this particular speech act is established
that Mark can be said to have recognized the communicative
intention that motivated Jane’s original utterance.
From assigning referents to indexicals to establishing the
illocutionary force of Jane’s utterance, Mark must perform a
range of complex cognitive processes in the above exchange.
But he is not alone in this regard. Jane, too, must exercise
similar cognitive processes if she is to succeed in making sense of
Mark’s contribution to this exchange. Jane must also undertake
pragmatic developments of the logical form of Mark’s utterance.
She must establish that her parents are the referent of the
pronoun “they” in Mark’s utterance. She must also be able to
establish a temporal referent for the expression “last year” in this
utterance. Some concept narrowing is required to appreciate the
meaning of “heat” in Mark’s utterance. Jane must understand
this term to mean the high temperatures in Spain rather than
just a general state or quality of being hot. Even after she has
arrived at the proposition which is expressed byMark’s utterance,
Jane must engage in further pragmatic processing in order to
obtain the implicature of his utterance. That implicature is
calculable on the assumption that Mark is attempting to make
a relevant contribution to the exchange notwithstanding his
apparent failure to address the specific issue raised by Jane’s direct
question. That issue—Mark’s willingness to undertake another
trip to Spain in the company of Jane’s parents—has significant
implications for the social relationship that exists between Mark
and Jane, particularly if Mark does not welcome the opportunity
to spend more time with Jane’s parents. Jane must use her
knowledge of that relationship to decide that if Mark is going to
decline her proposal to travel to Spain, he is most likely to do
so indirectly by way of an implicature. The recognition of this
particular implicature is signaled by Jane in her final utterance
in the exchange when she states that she will present the same
proposal to Bill instead.
It is through a complex interplay of cognitive processes that
the utterances in the above exchange are meaningful to Mark and
Jane. I have argued elsewhere that these processes take the form of
a single, undifferentiated ToM-based mechanism which achieves
the pragmatic enrichment of the logical form of an utterance
and the recovery of implicatures proper (Cummings, 2014a). In
order for Jane to establish the referent of the indexical “they”
in Mark’s utterance in the above exchange, she must attribute to
him many of the same mental states that she will use to recover
the implicature of his utterance. However, of more interest in
the present discussion is not that a ToM-based mechanism is
used in both the pre- and post-propositional processing of an
utterance—we will take it as unproblematic that it is—but the
exact nature of this ToM-based mechanism. Expanding on an
earlier discussion in Cummings (2014b), it will be argued that
this mechanism cannot be a cognitive module or other highly
specialized inferential device and be an authentic representation
of the cognitive processes involved in utterance interpretation,
at least to the extent that the latter has the type of rational,
intentional, holistic character proposed in this paper. To see
that this is the case, we need only examine in more detail
the cognitive processes which Mark and Jane must undertake
in order to participate in the above exchange. These processes
involve nothing short of a full-blown ToM of a type that lies well
beyond the representational capacity of a cognitive module or
other specialized inferential device. Empirical support for these
processes is presented in later sections. In the remainder of this
section, these processes are examined on their own terms.
That an unbounded rational capacity is exercised byMark and
Jane in the above exchange is a key component of the cognitive
account of utterance interpretation proposed in this paper. If
this capacity is a truly unbounded entity, as it is contended,
then it should not be possible to place a limit on the rational
considerations which come into play in the above exchange.
However, if this capacity is a bounded construct which can be
circumscribed and even modularized, then we must recognize a
point at which a line can be drawn around the rational capacity
that Mark and Jane are using in this exchange. That the former
scenario best represents this rational capacity, both in relation
to the calculation of implicatures and the primary pragmatic
processes2 used to obtain the propositions of utterances, will
now be demonstrated. Let us return to Mark’s utterance in
the above exchange. That utterance was taken to generate the
implicature that Mark does not want to travel to Spain with Jane’s
parents in the summer. According to the standard pragmatic
account of utterance interpretation, that implicature is arrived
at by a process of reasoning which uses as its “premises” certain
mutually held expectations about the rational conduct of (verbal
communicative) behavior. These expectations require Mark to
contribute only those utterances to the exchange which will have
some relevance to, or salience for, his communicative partner
Jane. Accordingly, any utterance that Mark contributes must
relate to the topic of Jane’s question (a summer trip to Spain) and
to the specific proposal contained in that question (the proposal
to travel to Spain with Jane’s parents). Mark’s actual utterance
fulfills these criteria only to the extent that Jane is able to draw
the following inferences:
(1) The use of “they” in Mark’s utterance refers to Jane’s parents.
(2) The use of “the heat” may be taken to mean the temperature
in Spain.
(3) The use of “last year” refers to the 12-month period prior
to the speaking of Mark’s utterance and, specifically, to the
summer time within that period.
2The term “primary pragmatic processes” is used by Recanati (1993) to refer to
pragmatic developments of logical form. These processes include saturation, free
enrichment, and transfer. The reader is referred to Bezuidenhout (2010) for an
excellent discussion of these processes.
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The primary pragmatic processes, which Jane must employ in
order to achieve reference assignment and lexical narrowing in
(1)–(3) above, are thus guided by her rational expectations
of Mark in this communicative exchange. But unlike most
pragmatic accounts, which would have Jane’s communicative
rationality end here, the inferences in (1)–(3) are themselves only
intelligible to the extent that Jane is in possession of a number of
other rational expectations. Several of these expectations relate
to Mark’s competence as a user of the English language. For
example, Jane must have as a rational expectation that if Mark
wants to refer to more than one person, he will know that
he must use a plural pronoun in order to do so. Jane will
also have a series of other rational expectations. For example,
she will have an expectation that Mark will have a sound
understanding of concepts such as time and physical properties
like temperature, and that he can appropriately capture these
concepts and properties in linguistic expressions such as “year”
and “heat,” respectively. But Jane’s rational expectations do not
even end here. She will also have rational expectations about
Mark’s world knowledge such that she will expect him to know
that Spain is a European country which has a warm climate.
Jane will also expect Mark to know that it is this warm climate
which makes Spain a popular destination for many tourists.
In short, the inferences in (1)–(3) above presuppose an entire
network of rational expectations which are not bounded in any
way and cannot be circumscribed, as most pragmatic accounts
of utterance interpretation would have it. What started out as
a series of inferences, which were aimed at achieving reference
assignment and lexical narrowing, quickly opened up into an
array of rational expectations which were as complex as human
thought itself.
The situation is no less complex when we consider the steps
which Jane must take in order to obtain the implicature of
Mark’s utterance. To derive the implicature that Mark does not
want to undertake a trip to Spain with Jane’s parents, Jane must
again engage in a process of reasoning which has certain rational
expectations as its “premises.” These expectations lead Jane to
search for the relevance of Mark’s utterance as a response to her
question. It is that search for the relevance or salience of Mark’s
utterance to Jane that leads her to draw the inference in (7) from
the propositions in (4)–(6):
(4) If my parents cannot travel to Spain, then it will not be
possible for Mark to undertake a trip to Spain with them.
(5) Mark has mentioned a factor—my parents’ intolerance to
heat—that may preclude them from undertaking a trip to
Spain.
(6) Mark has mentioned this factor with a view to reducing the
likelihood that such a trip will take place.
(7) Mark is implicating that he does not want to travel to Spain
with my parents.
On most pragmatic accounts of utterance interpretation, the role
of (communicative) rationality is limited to a number of rational
expectations which secure the recovery of the implicature in
(7). But it is not difficult to demonstrate that this cannot be
the case. This implicature is derivable on the basis of certain
rational expectations which serve to establish the relevance
of Mark’s utterance as a response to Jane’s question. One of
these expectations is that Mark is behaving as a cooperative
communicator in his exchange with Jane. But this single
expectation presupposes a range of other rational expectations
that are equally important to the recovery of the implicature in
(7). For example, Jane cannot have a rational expectation that
Mark will be a cooperative communicator in the exchange in the
absence of further rational expectations to the effect that Mark
has intact linguistic competence and that he can employ this
competence to communicate effectively in a range of contexts.
The expectation that Mark has intact linguistic competence in
turn presupposes other rational expectations about a range of
conditions which Jane may reasonably assume apply to Mark.
For example, she must have a rational expectation that Mark’s
language development has proceeded along normal lines, that
his linguistic competence has not been impaired by disease or
injury, and that Mark is not currently under the influence of
chemical substances which may, temporarily at least, disrupt his
competence. These additional rational expectations are integral
to what it means for Jane to have a rational expectation that
Mark is a cooperative communicator. As such, they are no
less important to the recovery of the implicature in (7) than
the expectation of cooperation which is routinely included in
pragmatic accounts of utterance interpretation.
It is important to point out that the difference between
the view of utterance interpretation proposed in this paper
and that which is adopted by standard pragmatic accounts
is not merely one of emphasis. For the network of rational
expectations examined above plays a particularly critical role in
utterance interpretation. It is through this network that Jane’s
expectation that Mark is a cooperative communicator is even
an intelligible thought. Put quite simply, no sense can be made
of Jane’s expectation that Mark is behaving as a cooperative
communicator in her exchange with him in the absence of this
extensive network of rational expectations. For most pragmatists
and cognitive theorists, this network is rarely even alluded to
in their theoretical accounts of the cognitive basis of utterance
interpretation. In fact, modular accounts of this interpretative
process actively eschew the types of rational considerations which
are emphasized in the present context. The modularization of
any body of knowledge, should that knowledge be used to
interpret utterances or perform other cognitive processes, can
only proceed by excluding the prior rational expectations which,
it was argued above, Jane must have in order for her to viewMark
as a cooperative communicator. But in the absence of this prior
rationality, this modularized knowledge is not even intelligible
as an account of the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation.
That so many present-day pragmatists and cognitive theorists
subscribe to modular accounts of utterance interpretation, I have
argued elsewhere, is symptomatic of an impulse to theorize about
concepts such as rationality and meaning (Cummings, 2002a,b,
2005a,b, 2012a,b, 2014b). Those arguments will not be rehearsed
here. Rather, we continue our examination of the cognitive basis
of utterance interpretation.
Alongside an emphasis on the rational character of utterance
interpretation, the view proposed in this paper also challenges
us to think differently about the intentional character of this
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process. Of course, all post-Gricean pragmatic accounts of
utterance interpretation acknowledge the central role of the
recognition of intentions in this interpretation. It is only when
a speaker’s intention in producing an utterance is recognized that
a hearer may even be said to have understood what the speaker
means. However, communicative intentions, whilst important,
are merely one type of mental state which hearers must attribute
to the minds of speakers during utterance interpretation. Indeed,
if anything, intentions are dependent upon a range of other
cognitive and affective mental states which assume a primary role
in the interpretation of utterances. To see this, let us return to
the above exchange between Mark and Jane. In order for Jane
to recover the implicature of Mark’s utterance in this exchange,
she must be able to establish the intention that motivated this
utterance. Mark produced his utterance with the intention of
inducing in Jane the belief that he, Mark, does not want to
travel to Spain with Jane’s parents. But this intention is a type
of secondary mental state which is dependent upon other mental
states. Although these other mental states are not intentions, they
are no less important to the recovery of the implicature of Mark’s
utterance than the mental state of intention which is privileged in
pragmatic accounts of utterance interpretation. An examination
of the different mental states that Jane must attribute to Mark
before she can even recognize the intention that motivates his
utterance illustrates this point well.
In order to recover the implicature of Mark’s utterance, Jane
must attribute certain knowledge and belief states to Mark. These
states include knowledge that Spain is a European country, and
the belief that Jane’s parents are intolerant to heat. Jane must
also attribute to Mark a range of states based on desire. One
such state is that Mark wants to maintain his pre-existing social
relationship to Jane by declining her proposal to travel to Spain
with her parents indirectly by way of an implicature. Jane must
also attribute to Mark a desire to undertake foreign travel in
order to present her proposal to him in the first place. Alongside
knowledge, belief, and desire states, Jane must also attribute
certain states of ignorance or lack of knowledge to Mark. For
example, she must attribute a lack of knowledge of her summer
travel plans to Mark in order to make her own verbal behavior—
the revelation of those plans—a rational move in the above
exchange. Jane’s verbal behavior is also only rational to the extent
that she is able to attribute to Mark a lack of knowledge of
any forthcoming events that may coincide with, and preclude, a
summer trip to Spain. Alongside cognitive mental states, a range
of affective mental states are also integral to Jane’s recovery of the
implicature of Mark’s utterance. Mark’s smiling face and relaxed
demeanor may lead Jane to attribute a state of happiness to him.
To the extent that Jane wants Mark to accept her travel proposal,
the attribution of this particular affective state to Mark may
encourage Jane to present her proposal to him now rather than in
2 days’ time, when she knows Mark must have a tooth extracted
at the dentist. Jane may also attribute to Mark disgust of Spanish
food, and a fear of flying, two affective mental states which she
recognizes may incline Mark to reject her travel proposal.
It emerges that the full panoply of mental states—intentions,
knowledge, beliefs, desires, ignorance, happiness, disgust, and
fear—may be attributed to the mind of a speaker during the
recovery of an implicature. It also emerges that intentions hold
no special logical position within this wider set of mental
states, notwithstanding their dominance in pragmatic accounts
of utterance interpretation. The combination of these factors
leads one to doubt whether any cognitive module which is
specialized to process intentional data could even begin to
represent the mental states that are involved in utterance
interpretation. Like rational expectations before them, mental
states exist not as isolable units, but as part of a larger network
of intentional phenomena. Indeed, it is on account of this wider
network that intentions and other states are even intelligible
mental phenomena. It was demonstrated above that Jane is not
simply attributing an intention to Mark when she interprets his
utterance as a rejection of her proposal to travel to Spain. If
anything, that intention was a type of secondary mental state that
was only attributed to Mark after Jane had already attributed a
range of other cognitive and affective mental states to him. That
these other states are also instrumental to the recovery of Mark’s
implicature has implications for the type of cognitive structure
which can play a role in utterance interpretation. Specifically,
that structure cannot be a cognitive module that is specialized
for the recognition of intentions, as most pragmatists would have
it. In fact, any type of cognitive module serves only to exclude
the very intentional phenomena that make the recognition of
intentions during utterance interpretation intelligible. A quite
different form of description is needed. Some thoughts about
what that description may involve are addressed subsequently.
We turn to the final feature of the alternative view of utterance
interpretation proposed in this paper. That feature is the holistic
character of interpretation. To some extent, this feature has
already been addressed. It has been argued that the rational
expectations and intentional phenomena which are integral to
utterance interpretation are not isolable in any sense but exist as a
unified whole. This same holism applies to the knowledge which
speakers and hearers bring to utterance interpretation. That
knowledge is variously captured by pragmatists in expressions
such as “background knowledge,” “mutual knowledge,” “shared
knowledge,” and “world knowledge.” These expressions reflect
the fact that speakers and hearers use knowledge not only of
each other but also of states of affairs in the world during their
interpretation of utterances. This was evident in Jane’s exchange
with Mark, where Jane used knowledge of Mark’s mental states as
well as her knowledge of people, places, and events in the world
to derive the implicature that Mark does not want to travel to
Spain in the summer with her parents. For most pragmatists,
only certain aspects of Jane’s knowledge are relevant to her
interpretation of Mark’s utterance in this exchange. So, while her
knowledge that Spain is a European country may be judged to be
relevant to her interpretation of Mark’s utterance, her knowledge
that Spain has had three recessions in the last 5 years may not be
considered to be relevant. Also for most pragmatists, the former
knowledge can be circumscribed within a cognitive module or
other specialized inferential device, while the latter knowledge
can be disregarded as somehow irrelevant to Jane’s interpretative
task. For the sake of argument, let us assume that this account
of the knowledge that is used in utterance interpretation is not
just possible but is obtained in the particular case of Jane’s
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exchange with Mark. What would such a body of knowledge
look like?
The answer to this question is that we do not have the first
idea what such a body of knowledge would look like. In fact, we
must concede the complete unintelligibility of this knowledge. To
understand why, we need only examine further the knowledge
that Jane brings to her interpretation of Mark’s utterance in the
above exchange. It was suggested that this knowledge might
contain the proposition that Spain is a European country.
This proposition may even be represented within a cognitive
module that is specialized for utterance interpretation. And
for most pragmatists, the matter ends here. But it is not
difficult to demonstrate that this single proposition depends
on other propositions for its own intelligibility. For example,
the proposition that Spain is a European country presupposes
propositions to the effect that Europe is a continent and that
Spain is one of several nations in the continent of Europe. Let
us assume that both of these propositions are also represented
within the cognitive module that Jane uses to interpret Mark’s
utterance. Surely now we can draw a line around the knowledge
that must be permitted entry to the module. But the matter does
not end here either. For the module must also contain knowledge
to the effect that Spain and other European nations have their
own cultures and languages, that some of these languages (e.g.,
Portuguese) are also spoken in South American countries and
that bull fighting is a cultural tradition in Spain. The point that
is demonstrated by means of this example is that there is no
stage at which we can throw a net around the knowledge that
Jane uses during utterance interpretation and then claim this
knowledge to be complete. A fortiori, Jane’s knowledge cannot be
fully circumscribed within a cognitive module, even one which is
specialized for utterance interpretation.
The problem that the holism of knowledge poses for
pragmatists and cognitive theorists is that it is not possible
to circumscribe the knowledge that we bring to utterance
interpretation and arrive at an intelligible account of that
knowledge. Regardless of where we think we can draw a
boundary around the knowledge that is relevant to utterance
interpretation, it can be readily demonstrated that it is only
possible to make sense of this circumscribed knowledge by using
knowledge that lies outside of the boundary. This boundary
typically takes the form of an encapsulated cognitive module
or a series of such modules, each of which is specialized to
perform a particular function. This modular account has a
certain appeal to pragmatists. It appears to be complete in
the sense that a cognitive module contains all the knowledge
that is relevant to utterance interpretation. It also appears to
embody cognitive efficiencies in that the need for extensive
searches of background knowledge is obviated when knowledge
that is relevant to utterance interpretation is brought together
in a specialized cognitive module. But this completeness and
efficiency are more illusory than real. For what we have produced
is not a complete account of utterance interpretation but an
unintelligible account, which lacks a prior concept of knowledge
with which to make sense of the circumscribed contents of a
cognitive module. The dilemma that confronts pragmatists is
the same dilemma that confronts any cognitive theorist who
believes it is possible to produce a complete theoretical account
of concepts such as meaning, rationality, and knowledge. Such
an account appears to achieve the completeness of a theory.
However, it only does so by eschewing the very rational and
epistemic concepts that make that account intelligible.
Thus far, the discussion has addressed a number of conceptual
issues relating to the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation.
It has been important to reflect on these issues for at least
two reasons. First, they have encouraged us to take a critical
stance toward dominant (modular) accounts of utterance
interpretation. Second, these issues have also encouraged us
to think about what an alternative account of utterance
interpretation might look like, especially one that is construed
along the rational, intentional, holistic lines proposed in this
paper. Having addressed these conceptual issues, we are now
in a position to consider if there is any empirical support for
this alternative view of utterance interpretation. That support,
it will be argued, is to be found in a range of clinical disorders.
Specifically, children and adults with pragmatic disorders exhibit
problems in the use and understanding of utterances which are
consistent with the alternative view of utterance interpretation
that has been outlined above. It is to an examination of these
disorders, and their implications for an account of utterance
interpretation, that we now turn.
Empirical Support from Pragmatic
Disorders
The view of utterance interpretation proposed in this paper
receives substantial empirical support from a range of pragmatic
disorders. That view is expressed in a claim to the effect
that utterance interpretation has a rational, intentional, holistic
character. As a means of validating this claim, three types
of clinical case will be considered in this section. To the
extent that utterance interpretation involves the exercise of a
fully unconstrained rational capacity, and not some narrowly
defined communicative rationality, the first of these clinical cases
presents evidence of the presence of deficits in reasoning and the
use of inferences in domains beyond communication in subjects
with pragmatic disorders. It was also argued above that intentions
represent a mere subset of the cognitive and affective mental
states that must be attributed to the minds of speakers during
utterance interpretation. To the extent that this is the case, we
may expect to find evidence of deficits in the attribution of a
range of mental states beyond those of intention in children and
adults with pragmatic disorders. It was also argued above that any
account of the cognitive basis of utterance interpretation must be
able to represent the holism of knowledge. To the extent that the
knowledge we bring to utterance interpretation exists as a unified
whole, we may expect to find evidence of a tendency in children
and adults with pragmatic disorders to process utterances within
restricted or limited contexts. These contexts may be expected to
privilege certain (dominant) meanings of words and utterances
and limit the extent to which hearers seek alternative (non-
dominant) meanings. Having examined the empirical support
which exists for this view of utterance interpretation, the paper
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concludes with some thoughts about its implications for theories
of utterance interpretation.
Deficits in Reasoning and Inference
There is now extensive evidence of deficits in a range of
inferences related to utterance interpretation in clients with
pragmatic disorders3. Deficits in reasoning and inference have
been reported in children with specific language impairment
(SLI) and primary pragmatic difficulties (Botting and Adams,
2005; Adams et al., 2009), high-functioning children with autism
(Dennis et al., 2001), children with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (McInnes et al., 2003; Berthiaume et al., 2010) and
hydrocephalus (Dennis and Barnes, 1993; Barnes and Dennis,
1998), and in pediatric traumatic brain injury (Dennis and
Barnes, 2001; Moran and Gillon, 2004). Deficits in inferential
aspects of utterance interpretation have also been reported
in adult-onset conditions including schizophrenia (Corcoran,
2003), multiple sclerosis (Laakso et al., 2000), and right-
hemisphere damage (RHD) (Tompkins et al., 2000, 2001, 2009;
Lehman-Blake and Tompkins, 2001). These studies certainly
support the claim that there is disruption to inferences which
play a role in utterance interpretation. But this claim does not
go far enough for our present purposes. In order to support
the contention that utterance interpretation involves the exercise
of a fully unconstrained rational capacity, we must also be
able to identify deficits in reasoning and inference in non-
communicative domains. In effect, we must be able to give an
affirmative answer to the question: Is there any evidence that
children and adults with pragmatic disorders also experience
deficits in reasoning and inference in areas other than utterance
interpretation? These deficits include impairments across a range
of inference types and cognitive domains, and not just those
inferences which are associated with utterance interpretation. It
will be argued that evidence to this effect can be readily presented
for a number of the pragmatic disorders introduced above.
It is not difficult to demonstrate the existence of impairments
in a range of inference types in clients with pragmatic disorders.
The breadth of these inferential impairments across domains
provides support for the view that an unconstrained rational
capacity is exercised during utterance interpretation. Children
with SLI exhibit poorer deductive reasoning (Newton et al.,
2010) and analogical reasoning (Leroy et al., 2012, 2014)
than normally developing children. Individuals with autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibit deficits in analogical reasoning
particularly about non-living items (Krawczyk et al., 2014)
and defeasible conditional reasoning (Pijnacker et al., 2009).
Adolescents with moderate to severe traumatic brain injury
exhibit impairments in analogical reasoning ability (Krawczyk
et al., 2010). A broad range of inferential deficits also exists
in adult-onset conditions. Adults with schizophrenia display
impaired probabilistic inference (Averback et al., 2011), transitive
inference (Titone et al., 2004), associative inference (Armstrong
et al., 2012), analogical reasoning (Simpson and Done, 2004),
inductive reasoning (Corcoran, 2003), and deductive reasoning
(Mirian et al., 2011). In a study of patients with acute aphasia,
3For a detailed examination of this evidence, the reader is referred to chapter 2 in
Cummings (2014a).
non-linguistic abstract reasoning was the only cognitive domain
not to show improvement in the first year after stroke (El
Hachioui et al., 2014). Adults with penetrating head injuries and
focal lesions to the parietal cortex display deficits in transitive
reasoning (Waechter et al., 2013). Adults with a range of
dementias also exhibit deficits in reasoning. Yoshiura et al.
(2011) found evidence of deterioration of abstract reasoning
ability in individuals with Alzheimer’s disease and amnestic
mild cognitive impairment. Vartanian et al. (2009) reported that
patients with frontal variant frontotemporal dementia (FTD)
display impairments when engaging in transitive reasoning about
familiar spatial environments.
These studies clearly demonstrate that individuals with
pragmatic disorders experience an array of inferential deficits.
The fact that these deficits also occur across domains such
as reasoning about concrete and abstract entities, about
living and non-living items and during language processing
and visuospatial cognition suggests that there is disruption
to a central rational capacity in individuals with pragmatic
disorders rather than impairment of a specialized communicative
rationality. Just such a rational capacity is posited in the view
of utterance interpretation proposed in this paper. That the
exercise of a fully unconstrained rationality is at work in
utterance interpretation is now supported on conceptual and
empirical grounds. On conceptual grounds, it was shown that
the rational expectations which make communication possible
are only intelligible to the extent that there exist other rational
expectations which are as wide-ranging as human thought itself.
It is simply not possible to circumscribe or modularize the
rational expectations, thoughts, and concepts that play a role in
utterance interpretation. This conceptual argument in favor of an
unconstrained rational capacity receives empirical support from
the study of pragmatic disorders. It was argued that children
and adults with pragmatic disorders do not merely display
impairments in the use of language-based inferences. Rather,
inferential impairments in these subjects cut across cognitive
domains and types of reasoning. The latter findings suggest
that a central rational capacity is disrupted in individuals with
pragmatic disorders, and not some rational sub-domain that is
specialized for communication. But we must go further than
the demonstration of an unconstrained rational capacity if the
present view of utterance interpretation is to be upheld. For that
view also makes specific claims about the intentional character of
this process. It is to an examination of the empirical support for
these claims that we now turn.
Deficits in Mental State Attribution
It was argued above that post-Gricean pragmatic accounts of
utterance interpretation routinely acknowledge the central role
of the recognition of intentions in communication. Many of
these accounts also argue for the existence of an inferential
device or cognitive module that has become specialized to
the task of intention recognition (e.g., Sperber and Wilson’s
relevance theory). That the recognition of intentions is integral to
communication is one of the few indisputable facts of utterance
interpretation. But what is often overlooked is that the type
of mental state attribution involved in utterance interpretation
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extends more widely than the attribution of communicative
intentions to the minds of speakers. In fact, the interpretation
of any linguistic utterance involves the attribution of the full
range of cognitive and affective mental states to the minds
of other communicators. To the extent that this wide-ranging
intentional capacity is implicated in utterance interpretation, it
should be possible to find evidence of deficits in the attribution
of mental states other than intentions in children and adults with
pragmatic disorders. These states include cognitive mental states
like knowledge, belief, and pretense and affective mental states
such as happiness, fear, and anger. To the extent that evidence of
this kind is forthcoming, it may be used to support two claims.
The first of these claims is that there is no limit on the type of
mental states that may play a role in utterance interpretation
and that may be disrupted when interpretation is impaired.
The second claim is that it makes no sense to talk about a
cognitive module that is specialized to undertake the recognition
of intentions when such a device would require nothing less than
the modularization of the whole of human thought about the
minds and behavior of other people. The necessary general nature
of this cognitive module precludes any such specialization.
That the recognition of communicative intentions is impaired
in individuals with pragmatic disorders has been demonstrated
in a number of studies. For the most part, these studies reveal
a failure on the part of subjects to recover the implicatures
of utterances or establish the illocutionary force of speech
acts. In this way, children with SLI have been found to have
difficulty deriving scalar implicatures (Katsos et al., 2011), while
children with pragmatic language impairment (PLI) perform
significantly more poorly than those with SLI on questions
targeting implicature (Ryder et al., 2008). Pragmatic impairments
in schizophrenia are known to compromise the comprehension
and recognition of speech acts, maxims and implicatures (Tényi
et al., 2002; Mazza et al., 2008). McNamara et al. (2010) reported
that patients with Parkinson’s disease are less likely than control
subjects to activate indirect meanings of implicatures. The
interpretation of implicatures is also impaired in adults with
RHD (Kasher et al., 1999). These studies support the claim
that communicative intentions are a problematic mental state
category for children and adults with pragmatic disorders. But
then so, too, are a range of other cognitive and affective mental
states. Children with autism and Asperger syndrome (AS) have
been found to refer predominantly to desire and make few
references to thought and belief in their use of assertive speech
acts (Ziatas et al., 2003). Normally developing children in the
same study used a higher proportion of references to thought
and belief. Pretense is a problematic mental state for young
children and adolescents with autism (Bigham, 2008; Morsanyi
and Handley, 2012). Affective mental states are also impaired
in autism. Philip et al. (2010) found deficits in the recognition
of basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, and fear)
across facial, body movement and vocal stimuli in adults with
ASD.
Beyond autism, cognitive and affective mental states are also
impaired in a range of other clinical populations with significant
deficits of utterance interpretation. Children and adults who
have genetic syndromes with or without intellectual disability
exhibit difficulties with a range of mental state categories. Porter
et al. (2008) found a specific deficit in understanding false
belief in the subjects with Williams syndrome in their study.
Ho et al. (2012) found that individuals with velo-cardio-facial
syndrome show impairments in the attribution of complex
mental states to abstract visual stimuli. The attribution of a
range of mental states is also disrupted in adult-onset conditions.
Cognitive and affective ToM is impaired in patients with
paranoid schizophrenia (Montag et al., 2011). Individuals with
a high level of negative symptoms of schizophrenia have been
found to display selective impairment in their ability to attribute
affective mental states (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). There are
impairments of cognitive and affective ToM in individuals with
sematic dementia, with awareness of affective but not cognitive
ToM persisting into the moderate stage of the disease (Duval
et al., 2012). Patients with FTD are impaired relative to controls
in the recognition of the emotions of anger, fear, disgust, and
happiness through facial features (Oliver et al., 2014). These
patients alsomislabeled negative facial expressions as happymore
often than controls, a finding that suggested a deficit in the
representation of positive affect in FTD. Henry et al. (2006) found
that the recognition of basic emotions (e.g., disgust, anger) and
the capacity for mental state attribution was significantly reduced
in 16 adults with traumatic brain injury relative to controls.
It is clear from these studies that the meta-representational
deficit in clients with pragmatic disorders extends well beyond
the recognition of intentions. What can we conclude from this
finding? The only possible conclusion is that it makes no sense
to talk about a cognitive module that is specialized for the
recognition of intentions, or even just communicative intentions,
when the type of meta-representational capacity involved in
utterance interpretation extends into every aspect of our thinking
about the thoughts and behavior of other people. Such a general
cognitive capacity cannot be represented by a cognitive module,
even a module that is constructed along the broadest possible
lines, and be intelligible in the absence of a range of intentional
data that lie outside of the module. In the end, the intentional
character of utterance interpretation comes to mean much more
than the recognition of communicative intentions. For these
intentions only even make sense within a complex network of
other cognitive and affective mental states which are as pervasive
as human thought itself.Whatmakes it seem that these intentions
can be removed from this network and represented in their
entirety within a cognitive module is the assumption that it
is possible to develop a theory of these mental phenomena.
That assumption will be critically evaluated in the final section
below. In the meantime, we turn to the third and last feature
of utterance interpretation that is proposed in this paper. That
feature concerns the holism of the knowledge that we bring to
utterance interpretation.
Deficits in Background Knowledge
It is important to begin the discussion of this final feature of
utterance interpretation with a note of caution. The deficits in
background knowledge that we will address in this section should
not be taken to mean that individuals with pragmatic disorders
do not know that France is a European country, that potatoes are
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a type of vegetable and that fish live in water. On the contrary,
most children and adults with pragmatic disorders know all these
things and more. Rather, what is being claimed here is that
individuals with pragmatic disorders tend to interpret utterances
within limited or restricted epistemic contexts. The key feature
of these contexts is that they circumscribe the knowledge that
hearers could potentially use to interpret utterances. While this
tendency may simply reflect the wider processing limitations
of subjects with pragmatic disorders—a context of just a few
propositions is easier to retain in memory, etc.—its effect on
utterance interpretation can be devastating. For example, the
implicature that a hearer may derive from an utterance in a small,
restricted context may not be the implicature that the speaker
intended to convey. Also, it may not be possible to overturn or
defeat an implicature that is immune to changes within the wider
network of knowledge that attends utterance interpretation. Such
a hearer may persist in upholding a particular implicature of an
utterance or the dominant meaning of a word when it is clear
from the wider context that such interpretations are erroneous. In
this section, we will be concerned to establish if such a pattern of
misinterpretation actually exists among children and adults with
pragmatic disorders. To the extent that it does, we will have some
empirical support for the claim that any account of utterance
interpretation must succeed in representing the essential holism
of knowledge.
Children and adults with pragmatic disorders often experience
significant difficulties in the processing of context. These
difficulties are typically documented during tasks that require
the resolution of ambiguities based on linguistic context4. Jolliffe
and Baron-Cohen (1999) reported that normally intelligent
adults with autism or Asperger’s syndrome are less able
than normal controls to use context to interpret lexically or
syntactically ambiguous sentences that are presented auditorily.
Using a lexical ambiguity resolution task, Norbury (2005)
demonstrated that children with language impairment and ASD
plus language impairment do not use context as efficiently as
their language intact peers to suppress irrelevant meanings.
Difficulties suppressing contextually irrelevant meanings have
also been reported in children with hydrocephalus (Barnes et al.,
2004). Andreou et al. (2009) examined sentence context effects
in homonym meaning activation in patients with schizophrenia.
Unlike control subjects, who exhibited a pattern of selective target
facilitation following the presentation of sentences which biased
either the first or second meaning of equibiased homonyms,
no significant target facilitation was observed in the patients
with schizophrenia in this study. Grindrod and Baum (2003)
examined the ability of subjects with right-hemisphere damage
(RHD) and left-hemisphere damage (LHD) and nonfluent
aphasia to use local sentence context information to resolve
lexically ambiguous words. Subjects with nonfluent aphasia
activated both meanings of ambiguous words regardless of
4It may be objected that linguistic context is distinct from epistemic context and
that, for this reason, these tasks cannot reveal anything about the background
knowledge that we bring to utterance interpretation. However, this knowledge
should be interpreted broadly to refer to any information that we may use to
interpret utterances. All information, including information from the linguistic
context of an utterance, is background knowledge in this sense.
context at a short interstimulus interval and neither meaning at
a long interstimulus interval. The only contextually appropriate
meanings to be activated in the subjects with RHD occurred in
second-meaning biased contexts at a long interstimulus interval.
Grindrod and Baum concluded that LHD and RHD lead to
deficits in using local context information to complete ambiguity
resolution.
Aside from ambiguity resolution, there is also extensive
evidence of the failure of subjects with pragmatic disorders to
use context appropriately during the processing of utterances for
their implicatures. Ryder et al. (2008) examined the ability of two
groups of typically developing children and 27 children with SLI
to use context to generate implicatures in response to questions.
Nine of the 27 children with SLI were pragmatically impaired.
Only when an answer to a question was provided by pictorial
context did the children with SLI perform similarly to their peers
in the use of context to generate implicatures. However, children
with PLI performed significantly more poorly than the rest of
the SLI group on questions that required implicatures, leading
the authors to conclude that these children have particular
difficulty in integrating contextual information. Loukusa et al.
(2007) examined the answers given by children with AS or high-
functioning autism (HFA) to contextually demanding questions.
Analyses of the answers given by these children revealed that
they had all tried to use contextual information, albeit that they
had done so incorrectly. The examination of a category of error
not produced by the normally developing children in the study
indicated that the children with AS or HFA continued to process
questions even after a contextually relevant answer had been
given. Titone et al. (2002) found that patients with schizophrenia
showed reduced priming for literally plausible idioms (e.g.,
kick the bucket) but intact priming for literally implausible
idioms (e.g., be on cloud nine) compared with control subjects.
These authors concluded that patients with schizophrenia can
make normal use of context only when conditions (e.g., the
implausibility of certain idiomatic meanings) reduce the need for
controlled processing.
By way of summary, let us reflect on the significance of these
empirical findings for the holism of knowledge during utterance
interpretation. These studies demonstrate that processing
limitations in individuals with pragmatic disorders lead to
the interpretation of utterances in highly restricted contexts.
Within these contexts, utterances and lexically ambiguous words
are frequently misinterpreted, as individuals with pragmatic
disorders are unable to revise their understanding of language
to reflect wider contextual information. In effect, pragmatic
disorders directly disrupt the holism of the knowledge that we
bring to utterance interpretation. The processing limitations
of children and adults with these disorders forces them to
view this background knowledge as containing isolable elements
that can exist apart from other contextual information. The
erroneous interpretations arrived at by the subjects in the
above clinical studies is a clear demonstration of what can
go wrong when such a view of this knowledge exists. What
appears to be a restricted, self-contained context of background
knowledge is in fact a complex informational nexus that is co-
extensive with human thought itself. No component or element
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of this nexus can be separated from any other component or
element and be an intelligible representation of the context that
attends the interpretation of utterances. What makes it seem
otherwise is a strong impulse to theorize about the cognitive
basis of utterance interpretation. This impulse can now be
seen to distort the holistic character of utterance interpretation
in much the same way that it distorted the rational and
intentional character of this cognitive process. In the next section,
we consider the only possible route through this theoretical
impasse.
The Way Forward
Throughout this discussion, the urge to theorize about the
cognitive basis of utterance interpretation has been cast in the
role of villain. It is now time to examine that urge directly, and
explain why it has such disastrous consequences when utterance
interpretation is at issue. Theories of a whole range of phenomena
abound in science and elsewhere. We do not think it strange if
physicists develop theories of the gravitational forces between
the earth and the moon. In fact, we would be surprised if we
discovered that such theories did not exist. Theories explain and
predict events and behavior in the world, and our ability to make
sense of our environment would be significantly diminished
without them. Theories strive for completeness in that they must
account for all the data within a particular domain. And as
any scientist will tell you, a theory that cannot account for all
the data in an area will be very short lived indeed. But when
we turn to utterance interpretation, the idea that it is possible
to develop a theory of this phenomenon is quite a different
proposition altogether. The completeness aspired to by theorists
in other areas of inquiry is decidedly destructive when we turn
to a rational, intentional, holistic phenomenon like utterance
interpretation. For here the focus of our theoretical efforts are
concepts such as rationality and intentionality which, as we have
seen, are nothing short of human thought itself. The physicist
who develops a theory, even a fully complete theory, of the
gravitational forces between the earth and the moon still has
a set of rational concepts with which to make sense of that
theory. The pragmatist who develops a theory of the cognitive
basis of utterance interpretation must arrive at a fully complete
account of rationality and intentionality. But in the absence
of rational concepts outside of this theory, the pragmatist’s
theoretical enterprise lacks the intelligibility of the physicist’s
enterprise.
This view of the unintelligibility of theories of rationality and
intentionality derives from the philosophical insights of Hilary
Putnam (e.g., Putnam, 1988, 1994, 1995)5. For many years,
Putnam has railed against a certain way of doing philosophy
which can make it seem that the only way in which we can make
progress on concepts such as truth, meaning, and rationality is
to construct theories of these concepts. Such theories, Putnam
argues, only appear intelligible on the assumption that we can
occupy ametaphysical standpoint. From this standpoint, it seems
5The reader is referred to Cummings (2012b) and chapter 4 in Cummings (2005a)
for discussion of those insights such as they relate to utterance interpretation.
that we can survey human thinking in its entirety without
in turn presupposing the rational concepts which make that
thinking intelligible. But, to the extent that this standpoint is
devoid of rational concepts (how else are we to achieve the
completeness of a theory of human rationality?), what we end
up with is not a complete account of rationality or meaning
but an unintelligible account. In fact, in the absence of prior
rational concepts, such a standpoint is a “we know not what.”
In effect, the pragmatist who believes it is possible to generate
a theory of utterance interpretation is in the same position as the
metaphysical realist who has theoretical aspirations in relation to
philosophical concepts. The pragmatist believes it is possible to
capture the rational, intentional, holistic character of utterance
interpretation within a cognitive scientific theory. This theory
might be constructed around a cognitive module, or a series of
such modules, or some other inferential device. However, if the
discussion of the preceding sections has demonstrated anything,
it is that such a theory is nothing less than an account of human
thought. But at that point, what we have is not a complete
account of utterance interpretation but an unintelligible account.
Like the metaphysical realist, the pragmatist has not succeeded
in producing an account that we can recognize, let alone make
sense of.
Putnam’s challenge is to the theoretical impulse which
makes it seem that a cognitive scientific theory of utterance
interpretation is possible and intelligible. But he is not alone in
finding the entire research program that this impulse represents
flawed and incoherent. John Searle exhibits the same concerns
in relation to cognitivism, which is the view that the brain is a
digital computer. For Searle, the proposal that the mechanisms
by which brain processes produce cognition are supposed
to be computational, and that by specifying programs we
have specified the causes of cognition is no type of coherent
explanation at all:
“I used to believe that as a causal account, the cognitivist’s
theory was at least false, but I now am having difficulty in
formulating a version of it that is coherent even to the point
where it could be an empirical thesis at all” (Searle, 1992: 215;
italics added).
This lack of coherence arises, according to Searle, because
the cognitivist denies that the characterization of a process
as computational is an observer-relative characterization. A
conscious agent must assign a computational interpretation to a
pattern of physical events. In the absence of this agent, all we have
are neurobiological processes which are not causal explanations
of anything:
“The point is not that the claim “The brain is a digital
computer” is simply false. Rather, it does not get up to
the level of falsehood. It does not have a clear sense. The
question “Is the brain a digital computer?” is ill defined. If
it asks, “Can we assign a computational interpretation to
the brain?” the answer is trivially yes, because we can assign
a computational interpretation to anything. If it asks, “Are
brain processes intrinsically computational?” the answer is
trivially no, because nothing is intrinsically computational,
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except of course conscious agents intentionally going through
computations” (Searle, 1992: 225; italics added).
A complete cognitive scientific theory (Putnam) and an
intrinsically computational brain process (Searle) are just
different manifestations of the same aberrant impulse in
cognitive science. That impulse is to deny the existence of any
rationality outside of the theory or the causal explanation. Yet,
without this prior rationality we lack the very concepts that are
needed to make sense of the cognitive scientist’s theories and
causal explanations. That such theories and explanations are
unintelligible by their own standards is a clear sign that all is not
well in the cognitive enquiry which has brought us to this point.
So, if a theory of utterance interpretation is not just a bad
idea, but an unintelligible one, then what is the alternative? Can
we afford to take seriously the proposal to reject modular and
other theoretical accounts of utterance interpretation? And if we
reject these accounts, is there anything that we can intelligibly
say about utterance interpretation? For Searle, the way forward
lies in an inversion of the order of our cognitive scientific
explanations so that we get a different account of cause-and-effect
relations in these explanations. Our psychological explanations
are misguided when they posit deep unconscious mental causes
of desired effects such as perceptual judgments or grammatical
sentences. Rather, what appear to be mental causes of patterns in
perception or language are actually the judgments of a conscious
agent who is outside the perceptual and linguistic systems:
“The inversion radically alters the ontology of cognitive
science explanation by eliminating a whole level of deep
unconscious psychological causes. The normative element
that was supposed to be inside the system in virtue of its
psychological content now comes back in when a conscious
agent outside the mechanism makes judgments about its
functioning” (Searle, 1992: 237; italics in original).
Applied to utterance interpretation, it is Searle’s claim that we
are mistaken when we posit modular processes that somehow
stand behind, and give a causal explanation of, our understanding
of utterances. There are “brute physical mechanisms” in our
brain which cause and sustain conscious thoughts, experiences,
actions, and memories. But that is all there is. There is
no level of deep unconscious mental processes which give a
causal explanation of these thoughts and experiences. There is
no intrinsic intentionality in any of the mechanisms we are
attempting to explain, only in the conscious agents who are
making judgments of these mechanisms:
“The elimination of the deep unconscious level marks two
major changes: It gets rid of a whole level of psychological
causation and it shifts the normative component out of the
mechanism to the eye of the beholder of the mechanism”
(Searle, 1992: 238).
Searle’s dissatisfaction with cognitive scientific accounts of mind
is matched by Putnam’s concerns that the entire cognitive
scientific venture has led us into unintelligibility. Putnam, too,
seeks a different type of explanation, one in which the “eye of the
beholder” can tell us something about normative concepts such as
meaning and rationality in a way that cognitive scientific theories
have failed to. Importantly, the eye of the beholder is not a “God’s
Eye point of view” or metaphysical standpoint, from which it is
assumed we can survey the whole of rational thought without,
in turn, presupposing rational concepts. It is the assumption
of this standpoint which makes it seem that it is possible to
generate complete cognitive scientific theories in the same way
that it is possible to generate complete scientific theories of
physical phenomena in the world. Like Searle’s “rediscovery of
the mind,” Putnam believes it is possible to recover an intelligible
position in the philosophy of mind. It is part of Putnam’s
own attempt at recovery—what he has described as common-
sense realism and a “deliberate” or “second naivete” about
conception—that he would have us take seriously the teachings
of Wittgenstein. This requires that we engage in a process of
description, the aim of which is an accurate characterization
of the consequences that a particular picture, and the concepts
inherent in it, has for its user. In his Lectures and Conversations on
Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief, Wittgenstein (1966)
describes the considerations that are subsumed within this type
of description:
“God’s eye sees everything”—I want to say of this that it uses a
picture.
I don’t want to belittle...the person who says it...
We associate a particular use with a picture...
What conclusions are you going to draw?...Are eyebrows
going to be talked of, in connection with the Eye of God?...
If I say he used a picture, I don’t want to say anything he
himself wouldn’t say. I want to say he draws these conclusions.
Isn’t it as important as anything else, what picture he does
use?...
The whole weightmay be in the picture...When I say he’s using
a picture, I am merely making a grammatical remark: [What I
say] can only be verified by the consequences he does or does
not draw...
All I wished to characterize was the consequences he wished
to draw. If I wished to say anything more I was merely being
philosophically arrogant (pp. 71–72).
The most outstanding feature of this descriptive process is the
restrictions placed on the extent of the description. Wittgenstein
(1966) doesn’t want to say anything he—the user of the
picture—himself wouldn’t say. Indeed, to say more is “being
philosophically arrogant.” In fact, to say more is to proceed to
philosophize in the manner urged by the metaphysical spirit,
a manner in which we describe the application of a picture
through an understanding of that same picture in isolation from
its applications. Under the influence of the metaphysical spirit,
we inevitably go forward by erecting standards about what must
be the case in order for our thoughts to represent or refer to
reality. These standards can make it seem that there must be
something which stands behind thoughts and which makes it
possible for them to represent the world. This “something” is
unconscious mental processes which, it is claimed, provide a
causal explanation of our conscious thoughts. It is these processes
which the cognitive scientist aims to give an account of in his
or her theories. But these processes are nothing but an illusion
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which arises, Putnam contends, when we attempt to characterize
normative concepts like meaning apart from the wider nexus of
rational concepts that is their home. As Searle (1992) remarks
“deep unconscious rules satisfy our urge for meaning” (246).
However, we are looking in the wrong place if we think an
account of meaning, rationality, and other normative concepts
lies anywhere other than conscious agents who use utterances to
mean such and such.
Cognitive scientific accounts of utterance interpretation also
appear to “satisfy our urge for meaning.” Unconscious modular
processes in particular appeal to our sense that “if the input to the
system is meaningful and the output is meaningful, then all the
processes in between must be meaningful as well” (Searle, 1992:
246). But there is no intentionality in the utterance interpretation
system, only in the conscious agents who attempt to characterize
that system. And it is from these agents that serious philosophical
work on concepts such as meaning and rationality must
proceed. In unpicking the complexity of these concepts in
Section A Standard Communicative Exchange, we employed a
form of description that opened up the rich interconnections
between them. Such was the extent of our mining of these
interconnections that it very quickly became apparent that we
could not make any sense of a concept like the context in which
an utterance is interpreted without also countenancing a vast
array of interrelated notions. In this way, it made no sense to talk
about the context of utterance interpretation without addressing
the knowledge of speakers and hearers, their purpose or goal
in speaking, their pre-existing social obligations and much else
besides. As our mining continued, we gradually became aware
that we were embarked on a descriptive process which had no end
in sight. Nevertheless, this was a process which revealed valuable
insights into the nature of the rational and other processes by
means of which utterance interpretation proceeds. Moreover, this
descriptive process revealed those insights without the slightest
pretension of being a cognitive scientific theory of utterance
interpretation. It is this very same process of description which
I now urge pragmatists to adopt as they pursue their many and
varied explorations of utterance interpretation.
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